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 9 
Summary 10 
Cooperation is ubiquitous in nature, but explaining its existence remains a central 11 
interdisciplinary challenge [1-3]. Cooperation is most difficult to explain in the 12 
Prisoner’s  Dilemma  (PD) game, where cooperators always lose in direct competition 13 
with defectors despite increasing mean fitness [1, 4, 5]. Here we demonstrate how 14 
spatial population expansion, a widespread natural phenomenon [6-11], promotes 15 
the evolution of cooperation. We engineer an experimental PD game in the budding 16 
yeast Saccharomyces cerevisiae to show that, despite losing to defectors in non-17 
expanding conditions, cooperators increase in frequency in spatially expanding 18 
populations. Fluorescently labeled colonies show genetic demixing [8] of cooperators 19 
and defectors followed by increase in cooperator frequency as cooperator sectors 20 
overtake neighboring defector sectors. Together with lattice-based spatial 21 
simulations, our results suggest that spatial population expansion drives the 22 
evolution of cooperation by 1) increasing positive genetic assortment at population 23 
frontiers and 2) selecting for phenotypes maximizing local deme productivity.  24 
Spatial expansion thus creates a selective force whereby cooperator-enriched demes 25 
overtake neighboring defector-enriched demes in a  “survival  of  the  fastest”.  We 26 
conclude that colony growth alone can promote cooperation and prevent 27 
defection in microbes. Our results extend to other species with spatially 28 
restricted dispersal undergoing range expansion, including pathogens, 29 
invasive species and humans. 30 
 31 
 32 
 33 
Highlights 34 
 35 
-Spatial population expansion selects for cooperation at population frontiers 36 
-Frontiers possess high genetic relatedness and create among-group 37 
competition	  favoring	  “survival	  of	  the	  fastest” 38 
-Spatial expansion favors genotypes promoting maximization of group 39 
productivity 40 
-Colony growth in microbes is a force promoting cooperation 41 42 
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Cooperation forms the basis for numerous complex phenotypes, from cell-cell 43 
communication and biofilm formation in microbes to nest construction in multicellular 44 
species [12, 13]. Explaining how cooperation evolves despite the direct fitness advantage 45 
gained by free-riding remains a central challenge in biology and the social sciences [1-3].  46 
This is particularly true in  the  Prisoner’s  Dilemma  game [1, 4, 5] where cooperators 47 
always  lose  in  direct  competition  with  defectors,  leading  to  a  “Tragedy  of  the  Commons”  48 
[14]. Nearly half a century of research on social evolution has offered insight into this 49 
dilemma, with inclusive fitness theory focusing attention on the importance of high 50 
genetic relatedness [15], multilevel selection theory highlighting the role played by 51 
competition among social groups [16, 17], and spatial games showing the importance of 52 
population structure [18-21].  Here we bring these three frameworks together, 53 
demonstrating that spatial population expansion creates a setting where both relatedness 54 
and intergroup competition are amplified, promoting the evolution of cooperation.   55 
 Spatial population expansion occurs when a species spreads outward to fill vacant 56 
eco-space or to supplant resident species, resulting in increased geographic range.  57 
Human migration out of Africa [7] is one salient example, while more generic examples 58 
include ecological invasions, epidemics, growth of microbial colonies, and expansion due 59 
to habitat modification caused by environmental disturbance or climate change [8-11]. 60 
Spatially  expanding  populations  form  a  propagating  density  wave  called  a  “Fisher wave”  61 
with a constant speed proportional to the square root of the mean growth rate (i.e., 62 
Malthusian fitness) of subpopulations at the front [22]. Genetically heterogeneous 63 
populations  may  also  form  an  “allele  frequency”  wave  representing  the  spatial  spread  of  64 
alleles [22] (see Supplemental Information).   65 
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 A small number of colonists initiate new subpopulations at the leading edge of the 66 
propagating  Fisher  wave,  creating  a  repeated  series  of  genetic  bottlenecks  or  “founder  67 
effects”  that  cause  stochastic  loss  of  genetic  diversity  at  frontiers  [23, 24]. Because 68 
cooperation is favored under conditions of high genetic relatedness [15], range 69 
expansions could thus in principle favor the evolution of cooperation.  However, there are 70 
at least three complicating factors. First, within-subpopulation selection favoring 71 
defection opposes genetic demixing, potentially preventing high cooperator relatedness 72 
from ever arising. Second, even with high relatedness it is not clear what selective force, 73 
if any, favors cooperation over defection in expanding populations. Finally, almost any 74 
genotype  that  stochastically  fixes  at  the  front  can  increase  in  frequency  via  “surfing”  [6, 75 
10, 24, 25]. Other genotypes that stochastically fall behind this front cannot typically 76 
catch up, even if they are more fit.  This is because they expand outwards in a trailing 77 
allele frequency wave traveling at a speed determined by the difference in fitness 78 
between defector and cooperator genotypes, (WD – WC), which will often be much 79 
smaller than mean absolute fitness.  For social traits, a genotype fixed at the frontier will 80 
outrun genotypes in the population interior and increase in global frequency provided that 81 
(1+b)/2 > c, where b is the social and c the direct fitness effect of the leading genotype 82 
(Supplemental Information). The social effect here refers to the fitness increment or 83 
decrement received by an individual from social partners (e.g. the benefit of the public 84 
good), while the direct effect is the fitness increment or decrement accrued to an 85 
individual for engaging in a social behavior (e.g. the cost of producing the public good). 86 
Note that this condition (1+b)/2 > c can be satisfied even when b < 0, and thus in 87 
principle surfing  may  promote  cooperation’s  opposites,  selfishness  and  spite  [26], 88 
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including spite against relatives.  Given these complications, it is not clear whether 89 
spatial expansion will in fact promote the evolution of cooperation. 90 
 To test the effect of spatial expansion on defector/cooperator dynamics, we 91 
engineered  an  experimental  Prisoner’s  Dilemma  game  using  cooperative  sucrose  92 
metabolism in haploid, vegetatively growing strains of the budding yeast, Saccharomyces 93 
cerevisiae [27].  Yeast secrete the exo-enzyme invertase in order to digest the 94 
disaccharide sucrose, which cannot easily be imported into the cell, forming 95 
monosacharides that are readily imported. In our strains, sucrose cannot be imported at 96 
all due to disruption of the genes mal12 and mal22 [28].  Because digestion occurs 97 
externally,  invertase  producers  (“cooperators”)  create  a  public  good  that  is  exploitable  by  98 
non-producers  (“defectors”),  who  gain  a  relative  fitness  advantage by not paying the 99 
fitness cost of production [27, 29].  We engineered a fluorescently marked defector strain 100 
by deleting the invertase gene SUC2.  101 
We note that in minimal sucrose media (YNB + 2% sucrose), competitions 102 
between SUC2+ and suc2- strains in shaken liquid culture were previously found to 103 
follow Snowdrift game dynamics [29]. In a Snowdrift game, the rare type (regardless of 104 
whether it is a cooperator or a cheater) has a fitness advantage, leading to stable 105 
maintenance of both cooperators and defectors [1, 30]. The maintenance of cooperation is 106 
therefore  easily  ensured,  in  contrast  to  the  Prisoner’s  Dilemma  game  where  the  107 
maintenance of cooperation is much more difficult to explain [1, 30]. In addition, 108 
cooperators in a Snowdrift game have a colonization advantage over defectors since 109 
defectors cannot colonize habitat unoccupied by cooperators [28]. This conflates 110 
colonization ability and cooperation by linking both to a single genotype. Because spatial 111 
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expansion is already known to select for colonization ability [31, 32], such linkage would 112 
prevent us from concluding that spatial expansion favors cooperation per se rather than 113 
superior  colonization  ability.    By  contrast,  defectors  in  a  Prisoner’s  Dilemma  game  do  not  114 
require the presence of cooperators to colonize new habitat, making it possible to 115 
disentangle selection for cooperation from colonization ability.  116 
 We therefore  used  two  approaches  to  construct  a  Prisoner’s  Dilemma  from  this  117 
system. First, we eliminated the rare advantage of cooperators that is necessary for 118 
Snowdrift dynamics by conducting competitions in media (YEP + 2% sucrose) in which 119 
our defector strains could grow in the absence of cooperators (most likely by consuming 120 
amino acids available in YEP, although growth is slower than for cooperators; Fig. 1A). 121 
This environment also eliminates the difference in colonization ability between 122 
cooperator and cheater strains, as cheaters no longer require the presence of cooperators 123 
to colonize the frontier (green line in Fig. 1A). Next, we engineered a defector strain that 124 
is resistant to cycloheximide, a translation-inhibiting drug that limits growth by binding 125 
to ribosomal subunit cyh2.  This creates a system in which we can experimentally impose 126 
a  tunable  “cost  of  cooperation” by varying the level of cycloheximide in the growth 127 
media. Specifically, increasing the cycloheximide concentration slows the growth of 128 
cooperators  but  not  the  resistant  defectors,  leading  to  an  increased  “cost  of  cooperation.”  129 
 When mixed with our defector strain in an unstructured environment (shaken 130 
liquid culture), our cooperator strain declines at all frequencies when a cost of 131 
cooperation is imposed, despite having a superior growth rate over defectors in pure 132 
culture  (Figs.  1,  S3).  These  results  are  consistent  with  Prisoner’s  Dilemma  evolutionary  133 
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dynamics. Unlike in a Snowdrift game, any increase in frequency of cooperators in our 134 
experiments is not due to rare cooperator advantage.     135 
  To determine whether spatial expansion can promote cooperation in our 136 
experimental  Prisoner’s  Dilemma,  we  initiated  spatial  expansions  by  spotting  a  droplet  of  137 
mixed cooperator/defector cultures onto solid media (YEP + 2% sucrose + 2% agar) for a 138 
range of imposed costs (see Experimental Procedures).  Spatial diffusion of cells in S. 139 
cerevisiae is caused when cellular growth generates an outward force leading to radial 140 
spatial expansions of colonies [8].  Note that expansion is not caused by active cell 141 
motility in this system as yeast lack motility.  Relative frequency measurements taken 142 
using flow cytometry show that cooperators initially declined in frequency at a rate 143 
consistent with that of well-mixed liquid competitions, but then increased in frequency as 144 
expansion proceeds (Fig. 2C). Likewise, image analysis of fluorescently labeled colonies 145 
shows  low  cooperator  frequency  near  the  initial  site  of  inoculation  (the  “homeland”),  but  146 
then increasing frequency with increasing distance from the homeland (Fig. 2E). Lattice-147 
based spatial simulations of  a  Prisoner’s  Dilemma  show  the  same  spatio-temporal 148 
dynamic of initial decline in cooperator frequency followed by increase as expansion 149 
proceeds (Fig. 2D). Cooperators invade when rare over a range of imposed costs (Fig. 3). 150 
Furthermore, when the benefit of cooperation is removed by competing strains on 151 
glucose media, the cooperator strain no longer increases in frequency upon spatial 152 
expansion (Fig. S4). These data clearly demonstrate that spatial expansion can promote 153 
the evolution of cooperation.  154 
 How does spatial expansion promote cooperation? Fluorescent colony images 155 
reveal the formation of discrete sectors of fixed genotypes (Figs. 2A,B, 3), which is the 156 
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colony-level signature of genetic demixing [8]. Thus, spatial expansion can lead to high 157 
positive assortment of cooperators via genetic demixing, even though this assortment is 158 
opposed by selection favoring defectors within demes (Fig. 1B, Supplemental 159 
Information). Local fixation of cooperators at frontiers despite counterselection within 160 
demes is analogous to surfing by deleterious mutations [6, 10, 24, 25] and requires 161 
similar conditions to obtain. In other words, spatial expansion leads to the formation of 162 
uniform sectors of cooperators or defectors, increasing genetic relatedness of nearby 163 
individuals. This diminished local genetic diversity reduces the direct competition 164 
between cooperators and defectors (see also [33]), thereby mitigating the principle 165 
selective advantage of defection.  166 
We  note  that  genetic  demixing  (i.e.  “sectoring”)  is  particularly  clear  in  our  167 
experimental yeast  system  because  yeast  lack  motility  and  “dispersal”  of  offspring  is  168 
local. In other systems, movement of individuals and dispersal of offspring can in 169 
principle blur sector boundaries and oppose demixing at the frontier. In the extreme case 170 
where movement and dispersal are very long-range, the spatial sectoring we describe here 171 
will not occur, and our analysis or results will not generalize to this situation. However, 172 
in real populations movement and dispersal are usually spatially restricted: a migrant is 173 
more likely to disperse nearby than far away. In this case, genetic demixing will occur 174 
provided that outward range expansion is sufficiently rapid compared to the rate of 175 
dispersal between occupied demes across sector boundaries (i.e., perpendicular to the 176 
expansion direction) [24, 25, 34]. In nature, species as diverse as rabies virus [35] and 177 
humans [36] show genetic signatures of expansion-associated demixing and sectoring, 178 
suggesting that the phenomenon we describe here may apply more generally. To the 179 
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extent that spatial expansion-associated genetic demixing is possible in a species, the 180 
mechanism we describe here promoting the evolution of cooperation will also be 181 
possible.  182 
Once cooperator sectors establish, their overall productivity will be higher than 183 
that of defector sectors provided the fitness benefit of cooperation exceeds the cost of 184 
cooperation, b > c (Supplementary Information). When this is true, cooperator sectors 185 
will expand radially faster than neighboring defector sectors, leading to a corresponding 186 
expansion of the boundaries of the cooperator sectors at the expense of neighboring 187 
defector sectors as we see in our experiements (Figs 2BE, 3). This leads to an overall 188 
increase in cooperator frequency, and suggests that range expansion creates a force of 189 
natural  selection  favoring  the  “survival  of  the  fastest.”  This  force  acts  to  promote  190 
genotypes supporting maximal group productivity, since high productivity sectors expand 191 
at a faster rate, allowing them to overtake lower productivity sectors. 192 
We turn to stochastic, lattice-based spatial simulations to further test the survival 193 
of the fastest hypothesis. To test whether survival of the fastest is indeed necessary for 194 
range expansion to promote cooperation, we eliminate this force by restricting expansion 195 
to one dimension in our spatial simulations. In one dimension, an expanding 196 
subpopulation has no neighboring subpopulations to compete with so that intergroup 197 
competition is absent.  In this case, we find that the probability of cooperator 198 
establishment at the front is never greater than the neutral probability of establishment 199 
(which is equal to the initial frequency of the allele, p0) and declines with increasing cost 200 
(Fig. 4). Put differently, cooperators can only outrun defectors in a one-dimensional 201 
Cooperation in spatially expanding populations 
 9 
Prisoner’s  Dilemma  if  they  randomly  take  over  the  frontier,  an  outcome  uniformly  202 
opposed by selection (Supplemental Information). 203 
 In contrast to the one-dimensional case, the probability of cooperators fixing at 204 
the frontier is substantially higher in two dimensions, where subpopulations compete with 205 
neighbors for occupancy of uncolonized habitat (Fig. 4). Two-dimensional expansions 206 
are also more efficient at purging deleterious alleles from frontiers, as seen in comparison 207 
of the black and gray dashed lines in Fig. 4. Our data support the conclusion that two-208 
dimensional spatial expansions generates selection at the frontier for genotypes that 209 
maximize group productivity, as these genotypes lead to the greatest expansion velocity 210 
of the front, allowing cooperator enriched demes to overtake defector enriched demes.  211 
Spatial expansion generates both conditions necessary for natural selection: heritability 212 
(positive  assortment  of  social  strategies,  making  one’s  social  environment  heritable) and 213 
differential  success  (survival  of  the  “fastest”). 214 
 Microbes posses a multiplicity of cooperative phenotypes [12], and rapid cell 215 
division in conjunction with large colony sizes makes the repeated emergence of defector 216 
mutants inevitable in nature. We have demonstrated that colony growth itself creates a 217 
force that promotes cooperation and inhibits colony invasion by defector mutants. Range 218 
expansions may promote cooperation more generally and may allow already cooperative 219 
species to shed social parasites, so long as the pattern and rate of dispersal and 220 
reproduction allow for genetic demixing upon expansion. It is possible that reduced 221 
cheater load upon expansion may accelerate biological invasion by cooperative species, 222 
with potential implications for biological control. Stochastic demixing may also occur 223 
with culturally transmitted phenotypes, such that range expansion may have been 224 
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important in the spread of cultural norms facilitating cooperation in humans. Yet this 225 
force persists only as long as expansion continues. Repeated cycles of expansion and 226 
contraction, possibly due to frequent disturbance, may be necessary to maintain persistent 227 
selection for cooperation by this mechanism.  228 
 229 
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FIGURE LEGENDS 333 
Figure  1|    An  experimental  Prisoner’s  Dilemma.    A) Populations composed of all 334 
cooperators (red) have a higher growth rate than pure defector populations (green), but B) 335 
cooperators lose to defectors within mixed populations.   Growth rate in A) was assayed 336 
on agar plates by measuring colony radius over time, which is directly proportional to 337 
rate of cell division S. cerevisiae [8].  Lines in B) represent cooperator frequency 338 
trajectories, measured with FACS, in shaken liquid culture over the course of one week 339 
for four different levels of imposed cost (cycloheximide concentrations: 50, 75, 100, and 340 
150nM, from top to bottom and blue to red).  341 
 342 
Figure  2|    Spatial  expansion  promotes  the  evolution  of  cooperation  in  a  Prisoner’s  343 
Dilemma.  A)  Growth of fluorescently labeled colonies (cooperators in red, defectors 344 
green).  B) Competitions inoculated with different initial cooperator frequencies (from 345 
top to bottom: 0.99, 0.90, 0.50, 0.10, and 0.01) after 7 days of growth (not to scale).  Note 346 
visible expansion of cooperator (red) sectors at colony frontiers, and proliferation of 347 
defectors (green) in colony interior. C)  Frequency trajectory of the cooperator strain in 348 
spatially expanding (solid lines) and stationary (non-expanding) (dotted lines) 349 
competitions as measured by flow cytometry (FACS) over the experiment. Dotted lines 350 
follow the same populations over the whole time-course, while spatial expansions 351 
required destructive sampling of colonies at each time point.  Note that frequency is 352 
measured over whole colony, not just at frontier.  D)  Frequency dynamics from lattice-353 
based spatial simulations of a PD game with non-overlapping generations in radially 354 
expanding (solid lines) and stationary (dotted lines) populations initiated from well-355 
Cooperation in spatially expanding populations 
 14 
mixed (relatedness = 0) homelands of varying initial cooperator frequencies, with 356 
simulation  parameters: W0 = 1, K = 50, m = 0.2, b = 0.5, c = 0.1 (see Methods).  E)  357 
Image analysis of experimental colonies after 7 days of growth. Cooperator frequency 358 
measured along the circumference of a circle of radius r centered at the colony center 359 
(importantly, this means that frequency is not cumulative).  Each line denotes the average 360 
over 3 replicates for different imposed cost (cycloheximide concentrations 0nM [dashed 361 
blue line] to 200nM [solid red line] at 25nM increments) with initial cooperator 362 
frequency of 0.10. Imposed cost in A,B,C was 50nM cycloheximide.  363 
 364 
Figure 3|  Invasion of rare cooperators during colony expansion over a range of 365 
imposed costs.  Colonies imaged after 7 days of growth (not to scale).  Competitions 366 
inoculated with cooperators at frequency 0.10 (top row) or 0.01 (bottom row), at different 367 
cycloheximide concentrations.  368 
 369 
Figure 4|  Selection for cooperation in spatially expanding populations requires 370 
competition among neighboring frontier subpopulations.  Results of lattice-based 371 
spatial simulations of a PD game in a population expanding in one direction (i.e., a linear 372 
front[8]). A) Example of the endpoint of a two-dimensional simulation (cooperators in 373 
red, defectors in green), while B) shows averages over 100-500 iterations, for two-374 
dimensional (black) and one-dimensional (grey) simulations. Each lattice site is a 375 
subpopulation growing logistically to size K = 50 in a metapopulation of dimension 376 
1x150 (one-dimensional) or 25x150 (two-dimensional) sites.  The vertical axis in B) 377 
gives the frequency of cooperators at the population frontier (defined here as a 1x10 or 378 
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25x10 area at the furthest edge of the population) after 200 generations. Horizontal dotted 379 
line indicates neutral expectation of this value. Simulations initiated with cooperators at 380 
0.10 frequency in a well-mixed (relatedness = 0) homeland of length 10 sites. Two-381 
dimensional expansions (black) select for cooperation, but one-dimensional expansions 382 
(grey) cannot. b = 0.5 for solid lines, and dashed lines denote zero social effect (b = 0); 383 
note that the horizontal axis has been normalized by b = 0.5. Simulation parameters: W0 = 384 
1, K = 50, m = 0.2. 385 
 386  387 
 388 
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1. Heuristic description of model and derivation of analytical results 
2. Supplemental Figures 
 Figure S1. Spatial expansion in one-dimension. Related to Figures 1- 4.  
 Figure S2. Spatial expansion in two-dimensions allows selection for cooperation.  
  Related to Figures 1- 4. 
 Figure S3. Selection against cooperators in a non-expanding population. Related  
  to Figure 1.  
 Figure S4. Glucose control experiments: Range expansion experiments in the  
  absence of cooperative benefit. Related to Figures 2, 3, 4. 
3. Experimental Procedures 
4. Supplemental References 
 
 
Heuristic description of model and derivation of analytical results: 
Mechanism of selection for cooperation during range expansion 
The fate of cooperators during a range expansion is determined by two phases, which we 
will take in turn. In Phase I, stochasticity at the frontier due to serial genetic 
bottlenecking causes local fixation of genotypes and loss of genetic diversity. Despite 
being selected against within subpopulations, cooperators can nonetheless fix at the 
frontier if stochastic effects overwhelm purifying selection. Once genotypes fix at the 
frontier,  the  expanding  wave  of  individuals  (the  “density  wave”)  will  almost  always  
travel  faster  than  the  “allele  frequency  wave”  (Figure  S1).  To see this, note that in a 
6XSSOHPHQWDO'DWD
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population growing logistically with diffusion of individuals via dispersal into 
neighboring habitat sites, the speed of such a wave in steady-state has a known solution,  
2dv DW         (1a) 
as does the speed of the traveling allele-frequency wave [1] 
 2f i jv D W W         (1b) 
 
 
Figure S1|  Spatial expansion in one-dimension.  Population size, N, as a function of 
spatial coordinate, x, in a spatially expanding population. In  the  Prisoner’s  Dilemma,  a  
mixed cooperator (red) and defector (green) front (A) will eventually resolve into a wave 
fixed for either cooperators (B) or defectors (C). Because cooperators lose in direct 
competition to defectors within each subpopulation (i.e., at each site x), outcome (B) 
requires that the stochastic effects of sampling at the leading edge overcome selection.  
However, once fixed, cooperators (or any other genotype) will outrun defectors, which 
advance in the trailing allele frequency wave. If defectors fix at the front (C), there is no 
trailing allele frequency wave because cooperators cannot invade defector 
subpopulations. 
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D is the diffusion constant, W  is the mean Malthusian fitness of a subpopulation (the 
maximal rate of increase), and Wk is the fitness of genotype k. In  the  Prisoner’s  Dilemma  
game we can write the fitness of cooperators and defectors as, 
 0 1C CW W bp c          (2a) 
 0 1D CW W bp         (2b) 
where W0 is the baseline reproductive rate, b is the fitness benefit donated by cooperators, 
c is the loss in fitness from cooperating and pC is the frequency of cooperators in a 
subpopulation (we assume that subpopulations are, by definition, well mixed in terms of 
social interactions, so that every individual has an equal chance of interaction with any 
other individual, and that choice of social partners is indiscriminate). From this, we have, 
  02 1d Cv DW b c p         (3a) 
  02fv DW c         (3b) 
where the c is positive if cooperators are fixed at the front, and negative if defectors are 
fixed at the front. This means that defectors can deterministically invade subpopulations 
fixed for cooperators (Figure S1B), but cooperators cannot invade defectors (Figure 
S1C).  So, we have 2 scenarios corresponding to Figures S1B,C: 
1) Cooperators stochastically fix at the frontier (Figure S1B): 
 a) Density wave of cooperators proceeds at speed: 
 02 1dv DW b c        (4a) 
 b) And is trailed by a lagging frequency wave of cheaters at speed: 
02fv DW c         (4b) 
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 c) Cooperation is stable at the front, and will contintue to gain ground and 
 increase in global frequency if:   
1
2
b c           (4c) 
2) Defectors stochastically and/or deterministically fix at the frontier (Figure S1B): 
 a) Density wave of defectors proceeds at speed:  
 02dv DW        (5) 
 b) There cannot be a lagging frequency wave of cooperators, because its speed is 
 not a real number. 
 c) Cooperation is eliminated.   
Because of this, cooperators can only increase in frequency in a one-dimensional range 
expansion if they stochastically fix at the front. Thus, there is no positive force of 
selection promoting cooperation in the PD in one dimension. 
 Importantly, this analysis has thus far been restricted to a single spatial dimension.  
In reality, most range expansions will proceed along two spatial dimensions. Two-
dimensional range expansions can undergo Phase II: competition among neighboring 
subpopulations at the frontier favoring genotypes with high productivity (Figure S2).  
Note that within subpopulations, selection favors genotypes with the highest relative 
fitness, which in the case of spite and selfishness (see below) actually causes a reduction 
in total reproductive output as these traits sweep to fixation. This is known as the 
“Tragedy  of  the  Commons”.  However, at the frontier, expansion speed is determined by 
absolute fitness, generating a force of selection promoting genotypes that increase 
productivity. In  the  Prisoner’s  Dilemma,  equations  S4a,b  tell  us  that  subpopulations  fixed  
for cooperators will travel faster than those fixed for defectors if, 
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b c          (6) 
Together,  Phase  I  (genetic  demixing)  and  Phase  II  (“survival  of  the  fastest”)  interact  to  
create a force promoting high productivity strategies such as cooperation (Figure S2).  
However, the specific parameter regimes in which this force can overcome selection 
within groups favoring defectors, which is necessary for Phase I, are not immediately 
clear. A more detailed theoretical analysis of the interactions between density and allele 
frequency waves in two dimensions will be required to provide specific conditions 
necessary for cooperation to evolve in expanding populations, taking into account both 
Phase I and II; this is an interesting topic for further work. 
 
Figure S2|  Spatial expansion in two-dimensions allows selection for cooperation.  
Populations expanding in two spatial dimensions, with each site at coordinate (x,y) 
representing a subpopulation connected to nearest neighbors by dispersal according to 
Kimura’s  stepping  stone  model [2]. A mixed homeland with rare cooperators will 
eventually demix upon expansion into subpopulations fixed for either cooperators (red) 
or defectors (green). Because subpopulations with cooperators expand faster than 
subpopulations of defectors, cooperators become enriched at the frontier by overtaking 
neighboring defector sectors.    
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Extension to other social behaviors 
Spatial population expansions may influence the evolution of other social behaviors as 
well. Consider spite and selfishness, strategies that reduce mean population fitness, but 
may spread nonetheless. Spite occurs when an individual reduces its own personal fitness 
to harm others (b < 0, c > 0) [3, 4]. Despite counterselection within subpopulations (due 
to fitness cost, c), spite can nonetheless stochastically fix at the frontier of an expanding 
population. Once this happens, equation 4c tells us that spitefull genotypes will increase 
in frequency in one-dimensional populations as long as c < (1 – b)/2, which can be 
satisfied over a wide range of parameter space.    
 Selfish individuals increase their direct fitness while reducing the fitness of 
neighbors (b, c < 0). Selfish genotypes are more likely to fix at frontiers than non-selfish 
genotypes because of positive selection (direct benefit of magnitude, c), and will also 
establish an allele-frequency wave that will chase non-selfish genotypes that 
stochastically fix at the frontier.  
 Two-dimensional spatial expansions, however, select against both spite and 
selfishness. Lower productivity of spiteful and selfish subpopulations makes them 
vulnerable to being overtaken by neighboring subpopulations of non-spiteful or non-
selfish strategies. A full exploration of this effect awaits further study.  
 
Experimental Procedures 
Strains: Strains were haploid (MATa) prototrophs with deletions of mal11 and mal12 
genes, constructed from W303 background with ADH1 promoter-driven expression of the 
fluorescent markers ymCherry (cooperators) and ymCitrine (suc2 defectors). 
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Experimental setup:  Overnight cultures grown in YPD were washed twice with sterile 
water, resuspended to a density of 2x108 cells/mL as measured by Coulter Counter, and 
mixed in appropriate ratios quantified by FACS. Stationary (non-expanding) 
competitions were conducted in round-bottom 96-well culture plates with 128 uL of 
liquid media: YEP (1% yeast extract, 2% peptone) plus 2% filter sterilized sucrose and 
the appropriate concentration of cycloheximide, both added after autoclaving.  
Cycloheximide stocks were diluted in ethanol, filter sterilized and stored at -20 C until 
use.  Wells were inoculated with 1uL of initial culture, and 1uL was passaged from each 
well into fresh media every 24 hours. Plates were incubated at 30 C on an orbital plate 
shaker at 1000 rpm. Strain frequencies were measured using FACS at days 0, 1, 2, and 6, 
with 3 replicates of each condition. Range expansion competitions were conducted on 7 
mL agar media (same recipe as above plus 2% agar) in 6-well culture plates.  The two 
center wells were left empty to avoid plate effects.  1 uL of initial culture was spotted 
onto the center of each well and plates were incubated at 30 C, with 3 replicates of each 
condition.  For frequency analysis, 3 replicates from each condition were chosen at 
random and harvested at the appropriate time point by repeatedly pipetting 2 mL PBS 
until colony was completely detached from the agar and well mixed, then the culture was 
diluted appropriately for FACS analysis. Growth rates were conducted as with the range 
expansions, but conducted in individual petri plates on 12 mL of agar media.    
Image analysis: Image analysis was performed with Matlab. Colony radii were 
determined from circle fits to the colony boundary, detected using edge detection or 
thresholding on the brightfield image of the colony. Sector boundaries were identified by 
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edge detection in the fluorescent images. Each sector was assigned a color by comparing 
its average intensity to the average intensity of its neighboring sectors.  
Simulations: Simulation were conducted on an nxm square lattice.  Each site of the 
lattice contained a subpopulation of size NT undergoing logistic population growth with 
genotype-independent carrying capacity, K, non-overalapping generations, and growth 
rate of genotype i at local frequency pi following:   'i i i T TN p p N N   , where 
   0 1 ( ) 1T C T TN W b c p N N K     ,  (1 )i i i i jp p p W W    , and  C DW W c   .  
Stochasticity was introduced by first computing Ni’ as a real number, then using the non-
integer part as the binomial probability of success over Ni trials.  The life cycle was as 
follows: cooperators produce a fitness benefit b, which is shared equally by all Ni group-
mates, at a personal fitness cost c, individuals then reproduce based on their fitness, 
die, and finally disperse.  The number of migrants of each type was a binomial random 
draw with success probability equal to m.  Simulations  were  initiated  with  a  “homeland”  
population with each site at carrying capacity and a binomial random number of 
cooperators with mean frequency equal to p0.  In linear expansions, the homeland 
consisted of 10 rows of sites filling the bottom of a cylindrical lattice (boundaries were 
periodic only in the direction perpendicular to the direction of expansion).  Radial 
expansions were initiated as a square block of demes in the center of a lattice. Scripts 
were written in Matlab with plots and analysis performed in Matlab and Mathematica. 
 
 
 
Additional Supplemental Figures 
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Figure S3| Selection against cooperators in a stationary environment.  Competition 
between cooperator and defector strains in shaken liquid culture for a range of imposed 
costs (cycloheximide concentration varied from 50 (blue) to 150nM (red): 50 nM, 75 nM, 
100 nM, 150nM).  Strain frequencies measured by FACS.  Any potential equilibrium 
between cooperators and defectors is below 0.01, making our system function as a 
Prisoner’s  Dilemma  for  all  conditions  considered:  increase  in  cooperator frequency in our 
range expansions cannot be due to rare advantage.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A) 
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B) 
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Figure S4| Range expansions in glucose media controls.  A) Cooperator (red) and 
defector (green) strains competing in expanding colonies on glucose rich media (YEP + 
2% glucose + 2% agar). The abundance of monosacharides and the absence of sucrose in 
the media render the coopertive phenotype, sucrose digestion, unnecessary. Thus, the 
benefit of cooperation is eliminated leaving only the cost of cooperation to distinguish 
strains. B) Image analysis of glucose controls for colonies with an initial frequency of 
cooperators of 0.90. Cycloheximide concentrations, from top to bottom: 0nM (dashed 
blue line), 75nM, 100nM and 150nM. Importantly, in these control experiments 
cooperators decline in frequency (from 90% in this case) when cycloheximide is applied, 
in contrast to the case when cooperation is beneficial in sucrose media (Figure 2E in main 
text). Note that the 0nM (dashed blue) line increases in frequency slightly from 90%, 
indicating a slight cost to cycloheximide resistance in the cheaters in the absence of 
cycloheximide.  
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